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 INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
Amici are European experts in data protection, 
privacy law, and related issues. Because of their ex-
tensive expertise in these areas, Amici are in a unique 
position to highlight conflicts between U.S. and for-
eign law that are almost certain to arise if the Govern-
ment is permitted to obtain data stored in Ireland un-
der the Stored Communications Act (SCA).  
A full list of Amici and their respective academic 
positions is set forth in the Appendix.1 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The presumption against extraterritoriality         
reduces the risk of conflicts between U.S. and foreign 
law by requiring that Congress, rather than the 
courts, decide whether and to what extent U.S.       
statutes apply abroad. Although the presumption     
applies even when an extraterritorial application of 
U.S. law would not conflict with the laws of another 
country, the presumption is “at its apex” when there 
is an evident risk of conflict. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Eu-
ropean Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2107 (2016). 
This case presents just such a situation. Enforcing 
the SCA warrant in this case would require Microsoft 
to transfer its customer’s data from Ireland to the 
United States. Regulation (EU) 2016/679, Apr. 27, 
2016, 2016 O.J. (L119) 1, the European Union’s       
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), regu-
lates this transfer, imposing detailed requirements 
that Microsoft must follow, and that the SCA warrant 
does not satisfy. In particular, the GDPR prohibits 
                                                            
1 All parties have filed blanket consents to the filing of amicus 
briefs. No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in 
part, and no person other than Amici’s counsel made a monetary 
contribution to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. 
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data transfers that are based solely on a foreign                   
government’s unilateral demand. Instead, the GDPR 
requires the use of the Mutual Legal Assistance 
Treaty (MLAT) between the United States and          
Ireland, one of a system of bilateral treaties designed 
to aid law enforcement in exactly the circumstances 
present here. But the Government has chosen not to 
proceed through the MLAT. Microsoft, therefore,      
cannot produce the data the Government seeks with-
out violating the GDPR. 
The Government has not addressed the GDPR’s 
relevance to this case. It does argue, however, that the 
Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 
2001, 2296 U.N.T.S. 167, E.T.S. 185 [hereinafter Bu-
dapest Convention], requires the United States to ap-
ply the SCA abroad. That argument is incorrect. In 
fact, consistent with EU data protection law, the Bu-
dapest Convention does not authorize countries to 
unilaterally collect data stored in other countries.  
The judiciary, this Court has cautioned in similar 
circumstances, is not well-situated to anticipate and 
address the international discord that could result 
from a conflict between the SCA and the GDPR. It is 
rather the political branches that have the expertise 
in foreign relations necessary to weigh the competing 
considerations involved. The Court should therefore 
interpret the SCA to apply only to data stored within 
the United States, leaving to Congress the decision 
whether and under what circumstances to authorize 
the collection of data stored in other countries. 
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ARGUMENT 
As this case comes to the Court, all parties agree 
the SCA does not apply extraterritorially. U.S. Br. 17. 
The only question is whether enforcing a warrant that 
requires Microsoft to gather and produce data it stores 
in Ireland is an extraterritorial application of the 
SCA. 
Amici believe the answer to that question is yes. 
Complying with the SCA warrant here would trig-
ger—and likely violate—European data-privacy laws, 
thus confirming its extraterritoriality. Despite the 
Government’s assertions, the acts of accessing, copy-
ing, and transferring personal data stored in Ireland  
will take place within the European Union and trigger 
EU law. See GDPR art. 3 (defining GDPR’s territorial 
scope); id. art 4(2) (defining “processing” sufficient to 
trigger GDPR’s application). The Court should not as-
sume that Congress intended the SCA to create such 
a conflict with foreign law. Instead, the Court should 
adopt a clear rule against applying the SCA to data 
stored abroad. 
I. The Presumption Against Extraterritorial-
ity Is At Its Apex When There Is An Evident 
Risk Of Conflict Between U.S. And Foreign 
Law. 
This Court has long recognized “that, in general, 
United States law governs domestically but does not 
rule the world.” RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2100 (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). In recognition of this 
“basic premise,” the Court has recognized a presump-
tion against extraterritoriality, under which a statute 
does not apply extraterritorially unless it “affirma-
tively and unmistakably” provides otherwise. Id.  
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The presumption’s primary rationale is to avoid 
“unintended clashes between [the United States’] laws 
and those of other nations which could result in inter-
national discord.” Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Co., 569 U.S. 108, 115 (2013) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). For that reason, the Court has held 
that “the need to enforce the presumption is at its 
apex” when there is an evident risk of conflict between 
U.S. and foreign law. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2107. 
The Court lacks the necessary expertise in the “deli-
cate field of international relations” to decide whether 
such a conflict will create international discord or, if 
so, whether that discord is justified by other interests. 
Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 115–16 (quoting Benz v. Compania 
Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957)). The 
presumption against extraterritoriality leaves those 
questions to Congress, which “alone has the facilities 
necessary to make fairly such an important policy de-
cision.” Id. (quoting Benz, 353 U.S. at 147).  
A risk of conflict between a U.S. statute and for-
eign law also indicates that the application of the stat-
ute is impermissibly extraterritorial. Domestic appli-
cations of a statute are unlikely to trigger foreign law, 
which typically does not govern conduct within the 
United States. Cf. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 
509 U.S. 764, 798–99 (1998) (finding no conflict be-
tween U.S. and British law where British law did not 
prohibit conduct required by U.S. law). Conflicts arise 
when applying U.S. law would regulate conduct that 
foreign law also regulates, which will tend to be con-
duct taking place in another country. 
The desire to avoid conflicts with foreign law puts 
the United States in good international company. Like 
the United States, other countries generally can enact 
extraterritorial laws. Compare EEOC v. Arabian Am. 
Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (“Congress has the 
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authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial 
boundaries of the United States.”) with Restatement 
(Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law: Jurisdiction § 201 
(Am. Law Inst., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016) (noting 
that “customary international law permits states to 
exercise non-territorial jurisdiction” under some cir-
cumstances). But international law encourages coun-
tries to “respect . . . each other by limiting the reach of 
their laws.” Hartford Fire Ins., 509 U.S. at 817 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting). International law limits “a nation’s ex-
ercise of its jurisdiction to prescribe,” id. at 815, and 
requires “every State . . . to exercise moderation and 
restraint as to the extent of the jurisdiction assumed 
by its courts in cases having a foreign element, and to 
avoid undue encroachment on a jurisdiction more 
properly appertaining to, or more appropriately exer-
cisable by, another State,” Barcelona Traction, Light 
& Power Co. Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 ICJ 3, 64, ¶ 70 
(Feb. 5) (separate opinion by Fitzmaurice, J.); see also 
Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v. Neth.), (1928) II RIAA 
829, 838 (establishing that international law protects 
countries’ “exclusive competence . . . in regard to 
[their] own territory”). This Court presumes that Con-
gress follows these requirements. See Murray v. 
Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 
(1804) (Marshall, C.J.). 
With respect to cross-border discovery, Ireland in 
particular has adopted rules designed to avoid con-
flicts with foreign law. In Walsh v. National Irish 
Bank, [2013] 1 ESC 2 (Ir.), a decision Ireland high-
lights in its amicus brief, Ireland Br. at 5–7, the Su-
preme Court of Ireland considered whether it could or-
der a bank to disclose information stored in a foreign 
country, when foreign law might prohibit such disclo-
sure. Id. ¶¶ 1.1, 3.3. Even though in that case the 
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bank’s own records (as opposed to the private corre-
spondence of others) were at issue, the court held that, 
before requiring disclosure of foreign-stored infor-
mation, Irish courts must determine (1) whether there 
is an alternative way to get the information, and (2) 
whether disclosure would violate foreign law. 
Id. ¶¶ 7.6–9.6. “Irish courts should not, without suffi-
cient clarity as to the consequences of the proposed 
measure, make an order which might place a party in 
a position of having to find itself in breach of the laws 
of another country.” Id. ¶ 9.4. 
These authorities bolster this Court’s commit-
ment to avoid conflicts between domestic and foreign 
law through the presumption against extraterritorial-
ity. In this case, the Court should not enforce the SCA 
warrant against Microsoft without first asking 
whether doing so could require Microsoft to violate 
foreign law. Amici are well-situated to answer that 
question. 
II. Enforcing The SCA Warrant Against         
Microsoft Creates An Evident Risk Of     
Conflict With EU Law. 
As other amici explain, and as the Government 
does not dispute, enforcing the SCA warrant in this 
case would implicate foreign data-privacy laws. E.g., 
European Comm’n Br. 8–16; Law Enforcement Offi-
cials Br. 4–8; New Zealand Privacy Comm’r Br. 12–14. 
The foreign law most relevant here is the GDPR, 
which takes effect on May 25, 2018, and will regulate 
the transfer of personal data stored within the Euro-
pean Union.2 As relevant here, it applies to all compa-
                                                            
2 The GDPR replaces the European Union’s 1995 Data Protection 
Directive (1995 Directive), 1995 O.J. (L281) 31, which has provi-
sions similar to those in the GDPR. European Comm’n Br. 2 n.5. 
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nies that process personal data in the European Un-
ion. GDPR art. 3; see also id. art. 4(2) (defining “pro-
cessing” to include “storage” of personal data). And 
while it was not in effect when the Government issued 
its warrant to Microsoft, it will be in effect by the time 
the Court issues its decision in this case, so it will gov-
ern any transfer of data from Microsoft’s Irish servers 
to the United States. European Comm’n Br. 3.  
The SCA warrant in this case likely does not com-
ply with the GDPR’s requirements. Enforcing the war-
rant would, therefore, create an evident risk of conflict 
by requiring Microsoft to violate EU law, thus illus-
trating the SCA’s extraterritorial reach in this case. 
A. Complying With The SCA Warrant 
Would Likely Violate The GDPR. 
1. As the GDPR recognizes, under EU law all “nat-
ural persons” have a “fundamental right[]” to “the pro-
tection of personal data.” GDPR art. 1(2). This right 
originates in Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 02, 
as well as Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (Convention for the Protection of Hu-
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms), June 1, 
2010, C.E.T.S. No. 005. See also European Comm’n Br. 
1–2 (identifying other international agreements pro-
tecting this right); Cannataci Br. 9–12 (same). The 
GDPR enforces this fundamental right by imposing 
comprehensive requirements on the processing of per-
sonal data located in the European Union. See GDPR 
arts. 5–6; European Comm’n Br. 8–12. 
The European Union’s commitment to personal 
data protection is not shared by all non-EU nations.  
The United States, for example, provides “more lim-
ited safeguards for privacy” than the European Union 
and imposes “fewer restrictions on how much personal 
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data may be collected, how such data may be used, 
and how long that data may be kept.” Francesca Big-
nami & Giorgio Resta, Transatlantic Privacy Regula-
tion: Conflict and Cooperation, 78 L. & Contemp. 
Probs. 231, 236–38 (2015). To ensure that the GDPR’s 
provisions cannot be avoided simply by transferring 
personal data to a country with less protective laws, 
the GDPR sets forth specific rules for the transfer of 
personal data from the European Union to a non-EU 
nation. GDPR, Recital 115. 
2. Article 48 of the GDPR provides that, unless oth-
erwise authorized by EU law, a court order requiring 
the transfer of personal data to a location outside the 
European Union must be “based on an international 
agreement, such as a mutual legal assistance treaty.” 
Such MLATs are thus “the preferred option for trans-
fers.” European Comm’n Br. 14. Indeed, the influen-
tial Article 29 Working Party recently issued a state-
ment asserting that MLATs “must—as a general 
rule—be obeyed” because “[t]he circumvention of ex-
isting MLATs . . . by a third country’s law enforcement 
authority” is “an interference with the territorial sov-
ereignty of an EU member state.” Statement of the Ar-
ticle 29 Working Party on Data Protection and Privacy 
Aspects of Cross-Border Access to Electronic Evidence 
at 9 (Nov. 29, 2017) [hereinafter WP29 Statement on 
Data Protection].3 This statement from the principal 
advisory body on EU data-protection law confirms 
                                                            
3 The Article 29 Working Party is the advisory body tasked with 
advising the European Commission with respect to data privacy. 
1995 Directive art. 29. It is made up of a representative from the 
data protection authority of each EU Member State, the Euro-
pean Data Protection Supervisor, and a representative of the Eu-
ropean Commission. Electronic Privacy Information Center, Ar-
ticle 29 Working Party, https://goo.gl/Xkg7PZ (last visited Jan. 
17, 2018). 
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that the GDPR prohibits Microsoft from transferring 
the data in this case unless it does so pursuant to an 
MLAT. 
The United States has entered into MLATs with 
the European Union and Ireland that would authorize 
Irish authorities to transfer personal data from Mi-
crosoft’s servers in Ireland to the United States. 
Agreement on Mutual Assistance, U.S.-European    
Union, June 25, 2003, T.I.A.S. No. 10-201.1 [hereinaf-
ter EU MLAT]; Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance, 
U.S.-Ir., art. 1.1, Jan. 18, 2001, T.I.A.S. No. 13,137 
[hereinafter Ireland MLAT]. Ireland represents to 
this Court that it is ready and willing to comply with 
its MLAT obligations “as expeditiously as possible.” 
Ireland Br. 8. The Government, however, has chosen 
not to employ the MLAT procedure. See U.S. Br.       
44–45. Nor does the Government argue that the trans-
fer required by the warrant is authorized by any other 
EU or Irish law. 
3. The GDPR provides no other basis for Microsoft 
to comply with the SCA warrant. Although Article 48 
applies “without prejudice to other grounds for trans-
fer,” none of the other grounds recognized in the 
GDPR applies. See European Comm’n Br. 14. Article 
45, for example, allows transfers to non-EU countries 
when the European Commission decides “that the 
third country . . . ensures an adequate level of protec-
tion.” GDPR art. 45(1). No such decision has been 
made here. For its part, Article 46 permits transfer 
under various “appropriate safeguards,” but, again, 
those do not exist in this case. GDPR art. 46(1)–(2). 
And Article 47 only applies to transfers within a cor-
porate group, not to transfers to non-EU countries. 
GDPR art. 47. 
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Nor would Article 49 of the GDPR, which sets 
forth “derogations for specific situations,” authorize 
the transfer here. The European Commission suggests 
that two derogations may be relevant to this action, 
but it does not argue that either derogation would al-
low Microsoft to comply with the SCA warrant. Euro-
pean Comm’n Br. 15–16. In fact, neither derogation 
could apply here without swallowing the privacy re-
gime that the MLAT requirement is meant to protect. 
a. As an initial matter, Article 49’s derogations 
must “be interpreted strictly,” so as not to defeat the 
GDPR’s protections. European Comm’n Br. 16. The 
GDPR requires that its provisions “be applied in order 
to ensure that the level of protection of natural per-
sons guaranteed by this Regulation is not under-
mined.” GDPR art. 44. The Article 29 Working Party 
confirms that “[l]aw enforcement access to personal 
data” interferes with the “right to protection of per-
sonal data” under the EU Charter on Fundamental 
Rights, so the GDPR’s “limitation[s] on the exercise of 
the rights and freedoms recognised by the Charter . . . 
must respect the essence of these rights and free-
doms.” WP29 Statement on Data Protection at 1. 
These principles guide Amici’s reading of the Ar-
ticle 49 derogations. To interpret the derogations to 
cover the SCA warrant in this case would undermine 
the GDPR and the protection for personal privacy it 
recognizes. 
b. The first potentially relevant derogation per-
mits data transfers where “the transfer is necessary 
for important reasons of public interest.” GDPR art. 
49(1)(d). Although Amici recognize the United States’ 
strong interest in criminal law enforcement, that is 
not an interest protected by this derogation.  
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First, the “public interest” must be one “recog-
nised in Union law or in the law of the Member State 
to which the controller is subject.” GDPR art. 49(4). 
Amici read this requirement to limit the “public inter-
est” derogation to public interests of the European Un-
ion or its member states, not those of non-EU coun-
tries. So does Ireland’s Data Protection Commis-
sioner. See Transfers Abroad, Office of the Data Pro-
tection Commissioner (Ir.), https://goo.gl/ezLigF (last 
visited Jan. 17, 2018) (“[The public interest deroga-
tion] is only likely to be relevant to public sector data 
controllers and only in circumstances where they can 
show that there is a substantial Irish public interest 
in the transfer of personal data.” (emphasis added)).  
Amici’s reading of Article 49(4) comports with 
other provisions of the GDPR, which recognize a “legal 
obligation” to process personal data only when that 
obligation is imposed by the European Union or its 
member states. GDPR art. 6(1)(c), (3). And Amici’s 
reading mirrors the Article 29 Working Party’s inter-
pretation of a similar derogation in the 1995 Directive, 
which could “only be used if the transfer is of interest 
to the authorities of an EU Member State themselves, 
and not only to one or more public authorities in [a] 
third country.” Article 29 Working Party, Working 
Document on a Common Interpretation of Article 
26(1) of Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 at 15 
(Nov. 25, 2005) (emphasis added). 
Second, a broad reading of the “public interest” 
derogation would supplant the GDPR’s detailed limi-
tations on transfers of personal data. As noted, the 
GDPR provides for transfers to non-EU countries only 
under specific circumstances, with MLATs providing 
the primary means for such transfers. GDPR arts.  
45–48. The entire purpose of MLATs is to facilitate co-
operation between countries in transnational criminal 
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matters while ensuring that the laws of both countries 
are not violated. See EU MLAT at 4 (stating parties’ 
purpose to “combat crime in a more effective way” and 
provide “mutual legal assistance in criminal mat-
ters”); Ireland MLAT art. 1.1 (providing for “mutual 
assistance . . . in connection with the investigation, 
prosecution, and prevention of offenses, and in pro-
ceedings related to criminal matters”). If a non-EU 
country could bypass the MLAT process any time pro-
tected personal data could aid a criminal prosecution, 
Article 48’s MLAT requirement would have essen-
tially no effect.  
c. The second potentially relevant derogation is ir-
relevant for much the same reasons. It permits trans-
fers that are “necessary for the purposes of compelling 
legitimate interests pursued by the data controller 
which are not overridden by the interests or rights and 
freedoms of the data subject.” GDPR art. 49(1). The 
European Commission raises the possibility (though 
does not analyze it) that a “compelling legitimate in-
terest” could be the controller’s (here, Microsoft’s) in-
terest in complying with non-EU law. European 
Comm’n Br. 15.  
But a data controller’s interest in complying with 
non-EU law is identical to an interest in not complying 
with the GDPR. Moreover, Article 48 addresses pre-
cisely those situations in which a non-EU country 
seeks data stored in the European Union, so the data 
controller will always have an interest in complying 
with such a request. It makes no sense to read Article 
49’s “compelling legitimate interest” derogation to 
swallow Article 48. See GDPR art. 49 (requiring a data 
controller’s interests to be balanced with those of the 
person who owns the data, requiring an assessment of 
whether “suitable safeguards” exist in the foreign 
country prior to the transfer of data, and mandating 
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that notice be given to the person whose data is trans-
ferred). The GDPR is not so self-defeating.   
In short, Article 48’s limitations on transfers of 
personal data apply, so the GDPR prohibits Microsoft 
from complying with the SCA warrant in this case. In-
stead, unless the Government seeks the data through 
the recognized MLAT procedure, complying with the 
SCA warrant would likely require Microsoft to violate 
EU law. 
B. The Budapest Convention Does Not    
Authorize The SCA Warrant. 
Although the Government’s brief does not address 
the GDPR, the Government does argue that constru-
ing the SCA not to apply to data stored abroad would 
“undermine the United States’ compliance with Arti-
cle 18 of the Budapest Convention.” U.S. Br. at 47, 49. 
With respect, the Government misunderstands the 
Budapest Convention.  
Article 18 of the Budapest Convention requires 
signatories to “empower [their] competent authorities 
to order . . . a person in [their] territory to submit spec-
ified computer data in that person’s possession or con-
trol.” Budapest Convention art. 18(1)(a). This text is 
ambiguous as to whether it covers all data wherever 
it is stored, or just data stored within a signatory’s 
borders. It does not clearly require what the Govern-
ment seeks in this case, which is unilateral                 
law-enforcement access to personal data stored 
abroad.  
Context resolves the question, however, for the 
Budapest Convention’s other provisions strongly sug-
gest that Article 18 is limited to domestic data. The 
Convention’s preamble recognizes the importance of 
protecting the “fundamental human right[]” 
to data privacy. Budapest Convention, preamble 
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¶¶ 10–11. Article 19, which expressly applies to law-
enforcement “[s]earch and seizure of stored computer 
data,” limits a signatory’s law-enforcement access to 
data “stored in its territory.” And Article 32 permits 
unilateral “trans-border” access to data only if the 
data are “publicly available” or the party who “has the 
lawful authority to disclose the data” consents.  
The Guidance Note to Article 32 makes clear that 
it—not Article 18—applies when a country tries to 
“‘unilaterally access computer data stored in another 
[country] without seeking mutual assistance.’” Cyber-
crime Convention Comm., Council of Europe, T-CY 
Guidance Note #3: Transborder Access to Data (Article 
32), at 5–6 (Nov. 5, 2013). None of Article 32’s require-
ments are satisfied in this case. The Government’s 
reading of Article 18 would render superfluous Article 
32’s limitations on “unilateral transborder access 
without the need for mutual assistance.” Id. at 3. 
Finally, the Guidance Note to Article 18 contem-
plates that signatories “may require that subscriber 
information be requested through mutual legal assis-
tance.” Cybercrime Convention Comm., Council of Eu-
rope, T-CY Guidance Note #10: Production Orders for 
Subscriber Information (Article 18 Budapest Conven-
tion), at 3 (Mar. 1, 2017). The MLAT between the 
United States and Germany (both signatories to the 
Budapest Convention) contains such a requirement. 
Treaty Between the United States of America and the 
Federal Republic of Germany on Mutual Legal Assis-
tance in Criminal Matters, art. 1(5), Oct. 14, 2003, 
T.I.A.S. No. 09-1018. This fact further belies the Gov-
ernment’s reading of the Convention. 
The Budapest Convention thus does not authorize 
the SCA warrant in this case or remedy the likely con-
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flict between the warrant and the GDPR. To the con-
trary, the Budapest Convention, as does the GDPR, 
reflects a strong default rule that countries must seek 
computer data from other countries through MLATs 
or other international agreements.  
III. To Avoid Conflicts Between U.S. And      
Foreign Law, The Court Should Limit The 
SCA To Data Stored In The United States. 
Because requiring Microsoft to comply with the 
SCA warrant here would likely conflict with the 
GDPR, the presumption against territoriality is “at its 
apex.” RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2107. It is implausi-
ble that an application of the SCA that so clearly       
implicates a foreign data-protection regime could be 
described as “domestic.” 
Indeed, the risk of “international discord,” id. at 
2100, is especially high with respect to data. Most of 
the world’s data centers are located outside of the 
United States. Yevgeniy Sverdlik, Research: There are 
Now Close to 400 Hyper-Scale Data Centers in the 
World, Data Cntr. Knowledge (Dec. 21, 2017), 
https://goo.gl/Vxg2sa. The countries in which those 
data centers are located have their own, often complex 
data-protection laws. Anupam Chander & Uyên P. Lê, 
Data Nationalism, 64 Emory L.J. 677, 682–713 
(2015). If the SCA permits the service of a warrant for 
data stored anywhere in the world, courts will have to 
confront conflicts with such laws all the time, if noth-
ing else as a matter of comity. Cf. Hartford Fire Ins., 
509 U.S. at 814–18 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining 
that even if a statute applies extraterritorially, its 
scope can be limited by international comity). Analyz-
ing such conflicts would plunge district courts into dif-
ficult questions of foreign law and expose them to the 
risk of “erroneously adopt[ing] an interpretation of 
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U.S. law that carries foreign policy consequences not 
clearly intended by the political branches.” Kiobel, 569 
U.S. at 116.  
The Court should avoid this risk by interpreting 
the SCA to apply only to data stored within the United 
States. Such a holding will provide a clear rule for 
courts considering SCA warrants. It will also let    
Congress make the policy decision whether to author-
ize unilateral law-enforcement collection of data 
stored abroad. Congress, after considering the inter-
national implications, may decide to do so, just as 
other countries have enacted legislation to permit 
such collection. See U.S. Br. 46–47; U.K. Br. 5–6. Or 
Congress may settle on a different approach, perhaps 
by specifying the situations in which extraterritorial 
warrants are appropriate and those in which they are 
not. Indeed, as recently as 2016 the Government pro-
posed legislation to amend the Electronic Communi-
cations Privacy Act, of which the SCA is a part, to au-
thorize access to data stored abroad. Letter from Peter 
J. Kadzik, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Joseph R. 
Biden (July 15, 2016). 
Whatever Congress decides, however, the Court’s 
decisions recognize that the choice should be Con-
gress’s to make. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 116. In the mean-
time, the Government’s MLATs with the European 
Union and Ireland provide an adequate, legal method 
for it to get the data it seeks from Microsoft. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Court should affirm the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals. 
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